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ABSTRACT
We consider the so called “wire-tap channel”, where a transmitter sends secret
information to its receiver in the presence of an eavesdropping receiver with similar
signal processing capability as the desired receiver. It is assumed that all the
communication links have time varying signal strengths1 which are only known at
the corresponding receivers and not at the transmitter. In this thesis, we address
the problem of characterizing the maximum possible rate of secret and reliable
information transmission on such a wire-tap channel. We first characterize the secrecy
capacity of a corresponding layered abstraction of the channel, and then, we derive
an upper bound to the secrecy capacity of the fading wire-tap channel. Finally, we
show that the wireless channels in the urban and most of the rural environments
belong to a class of channels called Stochastically degraded channels, for which we
have characterized the exact capacity in this thesis work.
1Such communication links are called fading channels.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In any form of communication, ranging from the primitive hand-waving signaling
to the state of the art wireless communications, the main purpose is to exchange
information among interested parties. Better communication system ensures faster
information transfer rate with better reliability. Before going into detail discussion of
how the rate of information transfer can be maximized, it is necessary to answer the
fundamental question first: what is information and how can we measure it?
Intuitively, any outcome that is deterministic does not contain any information.
For example, the result of an election where only one candidate is competing has
no uncertainty, because anybody can surely predict who is going to win beforehand.
Therefore, reveling the fact that the only candidate won the election does not provide
any information. On the other hand, consider the toss of a fair coin, the outcome
could not be known with certainty before the coin is tossed. As a result, knowing the
outcome of the coin reveal some information about the random experiment of tossing
the coin. From information transmission point of view, revealing some fact to a
person who already knows it, is pointless. Hence, information is always accompanied
by some amount of uncertainty to the event of interest.
The best way to model uncertainty and thus information is through Random
Variables (RV). Information content of a random variable is related to the amount of
the uncertainty associated with that RV. We know that a discrete RV is defined by
its Probability Mass Function (PMF), whereas a continuous RV is characterized by
its Probability Distribution Function (PDF). So, its not unreasonable to predict that
the information content of a RV should be a function of the PMF or PDF of the RV.
Let us call the random variable representing the outcome of tossing a coin Q.
The outcome has two possibilities: 1) Head and 2) Tail, with probabilities p and
(1− p), respectively. The outcome of the random experiment is most uncertain when
1
p = 1
2
, and most certain when p = 0 or p = 1. Hence, from our intuition, it follows that
if the random variable Q is equiprobable, the information content of the RV should
be maximum, and the information content reduces to zero when the RV assumes one
of the possibilities with certainty. A set of such intuitive guidelines are first converted
into mathematical constraints which finally yields the mathematical expression for
information of a random variable.
In information theory, the information content of a RV is represented by the
quantity called entropy. Although information theoretic entropy has a quite different
definition than that of the thermodynamic entropy, both have similarity in terms of
disorderness/randomness of the system. The thermodynamic entropy is a measure of
the disorderliness; consequently the thermodynamic entropy of a system increases as
the chaos increases. Similarly, the information theoretic-entropy is the measure of the
uncertainty the system, and the entropy increases as the system gets more random. In
what follows, we shall define the information-theoretic entropy and verify that many
properties of entropy corroborates our intuitive idea of a measure of information. The
definitions and/or notations of the information-theoretic terms those we state in this
chapter are taken from [1].
1.1. Entropy
We first introduce the concept of entropy, which is a measure of the uncertainty
of a random variable. Let X be a discrete random variable with alphabet X and
its PMF be denoted by p(x) = Pr{X = x}, xX . Without loss of generality, we
shall assume that X contains only those realizations of X where the PMF is strictly
positive.
Definition 1. The entropy H(X) of a discrete random variable X is defined by
H(X) = −
∑
xX
p(x) log p(x). (1.1)
2
Since the entropy function is not dependent on the exact realizations of the
random variable and is a function of the PMF, the entropy is often denoted by H(p),
as well. Hereafter, we shall assume that the logarithm is to the base 2 and the
resulting entropy value has a unit of bits.If the base of the logarithm is b, we denote
the entropy as Hb(X). If the base of the logarithm is e, the entropy is measured in
nats.
Let us get back to the example of RV the X, where it represents the outcome
of tossing a coin. The PMF of X is denoted by PX(x), where PX(heads) = p and
PX(tails) = (1− p).
The entropy of RV X is given by,
H(X) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). (1.2)
Let us say p = 1. Then the entropy is
H(X) = −1 log 1− (1− 1) log(1− 1) = 0− 0 = 0 bits. (1.3)
In (1.3), we have used the fact 0 log 0 = 0, which is justified by the slower rate
of decay of log(x) than x as x approaches zero. This result agrees with our intuition
of information content. p = 1 implies that heads appear with certainty, which in
turn converts the outcome deterministic with zero information content. Anyone can
predict the outcome. It is not surprising that the corresponding entropy is zero as
well.
Next, let us set p = 1
2
to examine the information content of RVX. p = 1
2
implies
the event of getting head or tail are equally probable, hence associated uncertainty
is of getting head is maximum. Equivalently,we can say that associated uncertainty
is of getting tail is maximum which in turns says that the there is no preference over
3
choosing the outcome as head or tail. Intuitively, the corresponding entropy which is
the measure of the information content of the RV should be the highest.
H(X) = −1
2
log
1
2
− (1− 1
2
) log(1− 1
2
) (1.4)
=
1
2
log 2 +
1
2
log 2 (1.5)
=
1
2
+
1
2
= 1 bits. (1.6)
Again, from our intuition, to convey the outcome of binary RV X, we should
not need more than 1 bit. We can describe the outcome of head as 1 and tail as 0,
hence, single bit is enough to describe the information content of RV X. The entropy
of the RV X with p = 1
2
agrees with the notion of the measure of the information.
Definition 2. The differential entropy h(X) of a continuous random variable X with
PDF fX(x) is defined as
h(X) = −
∫
S
fX(x) log fX(x)dx. (1.7)
where S is the support set of the random variable X.
We shall now define two other entropy terms named joint entropy and condi-
tional entropy which will appear in this paper quite often.
1.2. Joint Entropy and Conditional Entropy
We defined entropy of a single random variable in the last section. We now
extend the definition to a pair of random variables. There is nothing really new in
this definition because (X, Y ) can be considered to be a single vector-valued random
variable. Later, we shall see that joint entropy can expanded using chain rule.In
the derivation of the capacity for our fading wire-tap channel, joint entropy and
conditional entropy, and their relationship will play important role.
4
Definition 3. The joint entorpy H(X, Y ) of a pair of discrete random variables
(X, Y ) with a joint distribution p(x, y) is defined as
H(X, Y ) = −
∑
xX
∑
yY
p(x, y) log p(x, y). (1.8)
We also define the conditional entropy of a random variable given another as
the expected value of the entropies of the conditional distributions, averaged over the
conditioning random variable.
Definition 4. If (X, Y ) ∼ p(x, y), the conditional entropy H(Y |X) is defined as
H(Y |X) =
∑
xX
p(x)H(Y |X = x) (1.9)
= −
∑
xX
p(x)
∑
yY
p(y|x) log p(y|x). (1.10)
We have also the chain rule of entropy.
Definition 5. Let X1, . . . , Xn be drawn according to p(x1, . . . , xn). Then
H(X1, . . . , Xn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Xi−1, . . . , Xn). (1.11)
Using the chain rule, we relate entropy, conditional entropy, and joint entropy
by
H(X, Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X) = H(Y ) +H(Y |X). (1.12)
The naturalness of the definition of joint entropy and conditional entropy is
exhibited by the fact that the entropy of a pair of random variables is the entropy of
one plus the conditional entropy of the other.
The concept of entropy plays the central role in information theory. Most of the
other information-theoretic terms are built on the definition of the entropy. Next, we
5
consider another key concepts called mutual information. We will see shortly that
the mutual information between two RVs is actually the possible rate of information
transfer through a communication channel.
1.3. Mutual Information
Mutual information is a measure of the amount of information that one random
variable contains about another random variable. It is the reduction in the uncertainty
of one random variable due to the knowledge of the other.
Definition 6. Consider two random variables X and Y with a joint PMF p(x, y) and
the marginal PMFs p(x) and p(y). The mutual information I(X;Y ) is given by
I(X;Y ) =
∑
xX
∑
yY
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
. (1.13)
1.4. Relationship between Entropy and Mutual Information
We can rewrite the mutual information I(X;Y ) as
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ). (1.14)
Thus, the mutual information I(X;Y ) is the reduction in the uncertainty of X due
to the knowledge of Y .
By symmetry, it also follows that
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X). (1.15)
Thus, X says as much about Y as Y says about X.
It follows easily from the definitions of the above quantities that
I(X;Y ) ≤ H(X), I(X;Y ) ≤ H(Y ), and I(X;Y ) ≥ 0. (1.16)
6
Figure 1 below depicts the relationship among the aforementioned quantities
via a Venn diagram.
Figure 1. Relationship among entropy, conditional entropy, and mutual information.
Finally, we note that
I(X;X) = H(X)−H(X|X) = H(X). (1.17)
Thus, the mutual information of a random variable with itself is the entropy of the
random variable. This is the reason that entropy is sometimes referred to as self-
information.
We shall see shortly that the mutual information is actually the rate of
information transfer on a channel. To illustrate this connection, let us consider a
simple channel model where input to the channel is X and output of the channel is
Y . We assume, the channel is noiseless ideal channel, i.e., output uniquely determines
the input or input is a function of the output. Another way to say this in a simpler
way is that the input is exactly reproduced at the output.
7
The mutual information becomes
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) = H(X)−H(X|X) = H(X)− 0 = H(X), (1.18)
which is the maximum value that can be attained by mutual information. The term
H(X|X) represents the uncertainty remained in X after knowing X, which is zero.
On the other hand, let us assume the channel to be worst one (for example a broken
wire) such that output Y become independent of X. The mutual information is
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) = H(Y )−H(Y ) = 0, (1.19)
which is the minimum value that can be attained by mutual information. The term
H(Y |X) represents the uncertainty remained in Y after knowing X, which is equal
to H(Y ) because knowing X does not reduce any uncertainty of Y since they are
independent of each other.
I(X;Y ) can also be called as the mutual information of the channel. From
the above example, we can predict that the amount of information transferable is
dependent on the mutual information of the channel. It turns out that if we send
information at a higher rate than the mutual information of the channel, the receiver
cannot receive the information reliably.
Now, with help of above definitions, we can quantify the aforementioned notions
of rate of information transmission and reliability and subsequently, formally define
the maximum rate of information transmission with very high reliability, which is
popularly known as the capacity of a communication channel.
1.5. Channel Capacity
Any well thought transmission scheme shall have a well defined rate of transmis-
sion of information on a channel. If in addition, it is possible to make the probability
8
of decoding error at the receiver arbitrarily small, the corresponding rate is called
an achievable rate for the channel. Clearly, different transmission schemes will have
different achievable rates. The maximum achievable rate on a channel over all possible
transmission schemes is called the capacity of the channel. In particular, every choice
of the input distribution results in a new transmission scheme. As a result the number
of different transmission schemes are infinite.
The typical approach to characterize the capacity is thus to derive upper bounds
to the rate of information transmission and then compare with the achievable rates.
It is possible to derive different upper-bounds on reliable information transfer rate
for a particular channel. Each of these upper bounds serve as an upper bound to
all possible achievable rates for the channel. If any particular upper-bound coincides
with an achievable rate we call it the capacity of the channel.
On one hand, the capacity of the channel is an upper-bound to all achievable
rates for the channel but it is the infimum of the all upper-bounds. On the other
hand, the capacity is also an achievable rate, but it is the supremum of all achievable
rates. This particular explanation of channel capacity will be helpful to understand
the derivation of the secrecy capacity for our problem in chapter 3 and chapter 4.
Definition 7. We define the information channel capacity of a discrete memoryless
channel as
C = max
p(x)
[
I(X;Y )], (1.20)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions p(x).
This definition follows for continuous channel with only difference is that now
the maximization is carried out over the all possible input PDFs instead of PMFs.
Next, we consider few examples of channel capacity for some simplest channels.
Those examples will provide the idea how the channel capacity can be computed.
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In addition, we shall use some of the results in deriving the channel capacity of our
problem.
1.5.1. Noiseless Binary Channel
Suppose that we have a channel where the binary input is reproduced exactly
at the output. In this case, any transmitted bit is received without error. Intuitively,
one error-free bit can be transmitted per use of the channel, and the capacity should
be 1 bit.
Figure 2. Binary noiseless channel.
First,we will compute the rate upper-bound. In information-theoretic terminol-
ogy, this is know as the converse.
R ≤ max I(X;Y ) (1.21)
= max
[
H(X)−H(X|Y )] (1.22)
= max
[
H(X)
]
(1.23)
≤ 1 bit/channel use, (1.24)
because for a binary RV X, H(X) ≤ 1.
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Now, let us consider the achievable rate for a particular input X∗ with pX∗(x) =
(1
2
, 1
2
). The achieved rate R∗ for that iput is
R∗ = I(X∗;Y ) (1.25)
= H(Y )−H(Y |X∗) (1.26)
= H(X∗) (1.27)
SinceH(X∗) = 1 bit, the achievable rate
R∗ = H(X∗) = 1 bit/channel use. (1.28)
The upper-bound in (1.24) matches with the achievable rate (1.28). Hence, we
can say the capacity of the noiseless binary channel is 1 bit/per channel use.
Finally, we consider one more channel called binary erasure channel because in
our work, the capacity of a erasure channel is used to prove the achievability part of
the theorem 1 in chapter 3.
1.5.2. Binary Erasure Channel
Figure 3. Binary erasure channel.
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In this channel, each input bit is erased with probability . The binary erasure
channel has two inputs and three outputs as shown in Figure 3 above, where the
erasure event is denoted by the symbol e. It turns out that the capacity of the binary
erasure channel is
C = 1−  bits/channel use. (1.29)
The expression for the capacity has some intuitive meaning: Since a proportion
 of the bits are lost in the channel, we can recover (at most) a proportion 1 −  of
the bits. Hence the capacity is at most 1− .
With the help of definitions and concepts of this chapter, we explain the notion
of information-theoretic secret communication, previous works, and finally the outline
of our work in next chapter.
12
CHAPTER 2. INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECRECY
Traditional cryptographic way of secret communication is based on the secret-
key generation and exchange between transmitter and receiver. Due to broadcast
nature of wireless communication, this approach is vulnerable primarily in two ways:
efficient secret-key exchange is not guaranteed due to the fading characteristics of
the wireless channel; there is always a chance of breach of the secret-key by the
possible wire-taper with very high computing power. In contrast, the information-
theoretic secrecy concept is simple: based on the statistics of the legitimate and
eavesdropper channels, we can come up with a coding scheme that allows information
to be decodable only by legitimate receiver. The secrecy capacity is the highest rate at
which one transmitter can communicate a message securely to a receiver with perfect
secrecy in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
Figure 4. Illustration of a wire-tap channel.
Wire-tap channel model of figure 4 is given by
Y =
√
S1X + U1, Z =
√
S2X + U2, (2.1)
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where X is the transmitted signal by Alice is X, Y and Z are the received signal
by Bob and Eve, respectively. U1, U2 are additive white noise present at Bob and
Eve, respectively. The channel states are given by S1 for Legitimate channel and
S2 for eavesdropper channel. In information-theoretic terminology, S1 and S2 are
known as the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate and eavesdropper
channel respectively, and can be constant or time varying depending on the channel
characteristics. Bob and Eve can always measure the respective CSI from their
received signals. If Bob and Eve feedback the CSI information to Alice, then only
Alice can know the instantaneous channel states.
Suppose, Alice wants to communicate with Bob maintaining confidentiality of
message from Eve. In this setting, Bob is the legitimate receiver and Eve is the
eavesdropper. We call the channel between Alice and Bob as the legitimate channel
and the channel between Alice and Eve as the eavesdropper channel. The objective
of Alice is to transfer information at the highest possible rate with perfect secrecy.
Perfect secrecy is achieved when Eve fails to decode any confidential information no
matter what computing power she has. The notion of perfect secrecy precludes use
of any cryptographic method because such method fails when the eavesdropper has
infinite computing power. Is there any way to achieve perfectly secret communication
in presence of an eavesdropper with infinite computing power? The answer is yes and
it comes from the information-theoretic approach of achieving secret communication.
The ’catch’ is that Alice have to send at a lower rate satisfying the secrecy constraint.
Let us consider a very simplistic wire-tap channel. For example, suppose both the
channels are fixed; the point to point capacity of the legitimate channel is 5 bits per
channel use and eavesdropping channel is 2 bits per channel use. Basic information-
theoretic results say that a coding scheme can be constructed for perfectly secret
communication if rate of the code, i.e., the rate of communication takes place less
14
than the difference of the capacities of the channels which is 3 bits per channel use
for above case. The strategy of constructing of such coding scheme is to insert noise
in the encoding process to confuse the eavesdropper totally.
In information-theoretic terminology, suppose Alice wants to send a secret
message W ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR} to Bob. Alice maps the message index W (i) to a
signal codeword Xn(i) = X1(i), . . . , Xn(i) where i ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR} and transmits that
codeword in n channel uses. Due to the different channel gains and additive noise
at receivers, Bob and Eve will receive different signals. Let us say the legitimate
channel output is Y n(i) = Y1(i), . . . , Yn(i) and eavesdropper channel output is
Zn(i) = Z1(i), . . . , Zn(i). Based on the receive signals, Bob and and Eve try to
decode the codeword. After decoding, let us say, they declare the sent message is
Wˆ (i). To have secure communication, two certain things need to be achieved: The
decoding error probability at Bob must be arbitrarily small; the uncertainty of the
message given eavesdropper output must be arbitrarily close to the uncertainty of the
message itself. We say a secrecy rate R is achievable if for any  > 0 there exists a
encoder-decoder with rate R for sufficiently large code block length of n, such that,
the decoding error probably at legitimate receiver is
P
(
W (i) 6= Wˆ (i)) ≤ , (2.2)
and the message uncertainty given the channel output at the eavesdropper is
1
n
H(W |Zn) ≥ H(W )− . (2.3)
That is, the reduction of uncertainty of the message W due to the knowledge of Zn
at Eve is not more than  that can be made arbitrarily close to zero, which in turn
imply complete secrecy.
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2.1. Previous Works
Information-theoretic approach for secret communication first appeared in the
Shannon’s work [2] . In the pioneering paper on wiretap channel [3], Wyner laid out
the mathematical formulation of the information-theoretic secrecy. Wyner considered
a discrete memoryless wiretap channel where Eve receives a degraded version of Bob’s
received signal i.e. the channels form a Markov chain W −→ X −→ Y −→ Z. By
analyzing each channel as a binary symmetric channel (BSC), Wyner showed perfect
secrecy can be achieved if the information is encoded at a rate less than the difference
of the point to point capacities of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4] generalized the Wyner’s result for discrete memoryless
broadcast channel. Their analysis characterized the secrecy capacity, the highest
achievable secrecy rate, which is given by
Cs =
max
W→V→X→Y,Z
[
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)], (2.4)
where V is the auxiliary random variable for prefixing satisfying the Markov chain
W → V −→ X −→ Y, Z. The maximization is done over all valid joint distributions
PV,X(v, x) for the given discrete memeoryless channel PY,Z|X . Although (2.4) charac-
terizes the capacity, it is very difficult to find out the optimal PV,X(v, x). Authors [4]
showed that if the channels are fixed and legitimate channel is more capable than the
eavesdropper channel, i.e., I(X;Y )−I(X;Z) ≥ 0 for all X, then the secrecy capacity
archiving strategy is to setting V = X which means no need of prefixing auxiliary
RV. Hence, the capacity expression reduced to the Wyner’s result.Hence, the secrecy
capacity of a degraded channel can be written as
Cs =
max
p(x)
[
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]. (2.5)
16
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) are also valid for continuous channels because any
discrete channel can be seen as the quantized version of the continuous channel where
the quantizing interval is arbitrarily small. The detail proof can be found in standard
information-theoretic textbooks such as [5].
In [6], Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman considered a special case of Wyners
results known as the Gaussian wire-tap channel and solved it explicitly. In their
wire-tap channel, both the channels have fixed gain and received signals are further
corrupted by all white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Suppose, the legitimate and eaves-
dropper channel have fixed channel gain of a and b respectively,and U1 and U2 be the
additive Gaussian white noise with unit variance, respectively. For received signals
Y =
√
aX + U1 and Z =
√
bX + U2, the author proved that Gaussian input without
prefixing is optimal that achieve capacity, and with average input power constraint
P , i.e., E[X2] ≤ P , where E[.] denotes the expectation, the capacity is
Cs =
(
log(1 + aP )− log(1 + bP ))+, (2.6)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0). Hence for fixed AWGN channel, the secret communication
with positive rate is only possible when the legitimate channel has a better signal to
noise ration(SNR).
After those early works, the information-theoretic security issue was in long
hibernation due to several reasons, partly because of the unavailability of the
practical wire-tap code. In addition, to achieve a positive secrecy rate, the legitimate
channel needs to be superior to the eavesdropper channel. Furthermore, public-key
cryptography, proposed by Diffie and Hellman, [7] become popular security schemes
for its practical feasibility.
In late nineties, there had been a surge of interest in information-theoretic
secrecy approach. In combination of cryptographic method and information-theoretic
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approach can result in more robust and practical security scheme. More interesting
results are coming for wireless channel where time-varying wireless channel provides
an opportunity for secret communication. Since, channel state information (CSI)
at transmitter is important to exploit the randomness of the channel to obtain
physical layer security, previous works mostly focused with the assumptions that
CSI is available at the transmitter. But in a fast-fading wireless channel, timely
feedback of the channel measurement information by the receiver to the transmitter
is a challenging task. Although there are some results for without channel state
information at transmitter (CSIT), most of those works were carried out for specific
channel state distribution. The capacity of a fast-fading Gaussian wire-tap channel
with general fading distribution without CSIT is still to be found.
The secrecy capacity of slow fading channel with single-input multiple-output
with CSIT was characterized in [8]. In [9], secure transmission of information over
fast fading channel was studies. In that paper, the author considered full CSI where
the transmitter has the CSI of the legitimate and eavesdropper receiver both. Secrecy
communication for fast Rayleigh fading channel was considered in [10]. In that paper,
the legitimate channel is fixed-SNR Gaussian channel and the eavesdropper channel
is a Rayleigh fading channel with no CSIT. The author showed that for that channel
model, there can be a positive secrecy rate even if the legitimate channel is worse than
the eavesdropper channel on the average. The strategy to achieve positive rate is to
inject optimal white noise which can be computed from the statistics of the channel
states.
2.2. Problem Statement
We consider a fast-fading Gaussian wire-tap channel without CSIT. In our chan-
nel model, Alice wants to communicate with Bob with perfect secrecy in presence of
a passive eavesdropper Eve. We consider fast fading channel where the instantaneous
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channel state is available at the receivers but not at the transmitter. This is the case
in many practical wireless communication systems where channel states can only be
measured by the receivers which cannot inform the transmitter of the state accurately
in a timely manner through a feedback link due to the fast fading. Specifically, we
assumes independent fast fading i.e. the channel is changing in each symbol time,
where the fading statistics are known to the transmitters, but not the realizations.
This paper investigates the ergodic case where the code is designed to perform over a
typical realization of the time-varying fading process. We call the Alice-Bob channel
as legitimate channel, whereas Alice-Eve channel as the eavesdropper channel. Both
Bob and Eve know the instantaneous realizations of their own channels, but the Alice
know only the distributions of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels, not the
actual realizations. Channel fading state distributions for both channels are arbitrary;
we are not restricting for a specific channel distribution. Those assumptions make
the problem quite challenging. We address this problem first considering a layered
erasure wire-tap channel. Layered erasure model was introduced by [11], in which
each component channel is expressed in terms of a binary expansion.While in [11], the
model was used in a different communication scenario called the relay channel without
secrecy, we use the deterministic layered erasure model approach to obtain insights
about Gaussian wire-tap channel. We represent the fading wireless channel by time-
varying version of a deterministic model, called the layered erasure model, where the
state of a link corresponds to the number of most significant bits not erased. We have
complete characterization of secrecy capacity for such class of channel. Using insight
from the layered erasure wire-tap channel, we derive an upper bound for Gaussian
fast-fading channel and we show for some very interesting practical scenarios, the
fading wire-tap channels fall into a class of channels for which the upper-bound can
be achieved.
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The main contributions of this work are as follows.
1. We derive the complete characterization of the secrecy capacity of the layered
erasure wire-tap channel.
2. We derive an upper-bound of secrecy rate for fading Gaussian wire-tap channel
with arbitrary fading statistics.
3. For two very important class of practical wireless environment, we derive
achievable schemes can meet the aforementioned upper-bound, characterizing
the secrecy capacity.
In next chapter, first, we shall show how we can model a Gaussian channel as
a layered erasure channel. With that, we shall derive the layered erasure wire-tap
channel model for our fading Gaussian wire-tap channel. The secrecy rate upper-
bound will be derived for such layered eraser wiretap channel, and then we shall show
that the upper-bound is achievable.
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CHAPTER 3. LAYERED ERASURE WIRE-TAP
CHANNEL
In this chapter, we derive an upper-bound of secrecy rate, and subsequently
we show that the upper-bound is achievable for a layered erasure wire-tap channel.
Therefore we, in fact, characterize the secrecy capacity of such wiretap channel. The
primary motivation behind considering a layered erasure wire-tap channel is because
the analysis of such channel can be extended to the actual Gaussian wire-tap channel.
We shall briefly outline the concept of layered erasure model as explained in [11]. With
that, we shall formulate the layered erasure model for our fast-fading Gaussian wire-
tap channel. Using that model, we derive the converse, i.e., the upper-bound for
secrecy rate and finally, we prove that the upper-bound is achievable.
3.1. Layered Erasure Deterministic Model
On a communication channel, the Gaussian model is commonly used where
along with channel gain, all white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is added at the receiver.
The nature of the AWGN makes the Gaussian model difficult to analyze. Due to
this reason, the complete characterization of the capacity of most of the Gaussian
networks is still unknown except for some simplest networks such as the one-to-many
Gaussian broadcast channel (BC) and the many-to-one Gaussian multiple access
channel (MAC).Analysis for fading Gaussian channel without CSIT is way more
complicated. That is the one reason why it is still an open problem. However, A.
Salman Avestimehr et.al. showed a novel layered approach in [11] which can closely
mimic the properties of the Gaussian channel with simpler analysis to attack the
problem. This layered approach gives the insights about proving the upper bound
and potentially successful coding scheme for Gaussian case. To solve our problem,
i.e., to find the secrecy capacity of the fading Gaussian wire-tap channel, the layered
approach will be instrumental. Hence, we briefly outline how we can have layered
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channel for a Gaussian channel as explained [11]. With that deterministic layered
model, we shall derive the layered wire-tap channel model for our fading Gaussian
wire-tap channel.
Figure 5. A point-to-point Gaussian channel.
Let us consider a real scalar single-input-single-output (SISO) Gaussian point-
to-point channel as shown in the figure 5 , whose input output relation is given by
y = hx+ u, (3.1)
where x, y, h be the input, output, and gain of the channel respectively. u is the
AWGN at the receiver with zero mean and unit variance. There is also the average
input power constraint E[|x|2] ≤ 1 where E[.] denotes the expectation operation taken
over the input distribution. The relation between the channel gain and signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) with transmitted power and noise power both normalized to be 1 is given
by
|h| =
√
SNR. (3.2)
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Capacity of the this point-to-point channel is
CAWGN =
1
2
log(1 + SNR), (3.3)
where the base of the logarithm is 2.
For this scalar Gaussian channel, since x, u are all positive real numbers, we can
express them in terms of their binary expansions.
Any real positive number a can have a binary expansion
a =
∞∑
i=1
ai2
−i, (3.4)
where ai ∈ {0, 1}.
We express the input and the additive white noise in terms of their binary
expansion. Hence the input-output relation of the channel (3.1) can be written as
y = h
∞∑
i=1
xi2
−i +
∞∑
i=1
ui2
−i. (3.5)
Furthermore (3.2) can be expressed as
|h| =
√
SNR = 2log(
√
SNR = 2
1
2
logSNR. (3.6)
Hence (3.5) becomes
y = 2
1
2
logSNR
∞∑
i=1
xi2
−i +
∞∑
i=1
ui2
−i. (3.7)
Note that the channel gain in (3.7) actually determines the number of the input bit
levels that are above the noise floor. If the channel gain is high, we have higher
number of most significant bits of input above the noise level.
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Substituing n = 1
2
logSNR in (3.7), we get
y = 2n
∞∑
i=1
xi2
−i +
∞∑
i=1
ui2
−i (3.8)
≈ 2n
n∑
i=1
xi2
−i +
∞∑
i=1
(xi+n + ui)2
−i. (3.9)
Figure 6. Pictorial view of deterministic layered channel.
If the 1 bit carry-over from the second summation is ignored, It can be said that
the receiver gets the n no of bits correctly. Hence the point-to-point Gaussian channel
can be approximated as a pipe that truncates the transmitted signal and only passes
the bits that are above the noise level. Information can be encoded as a sequence
of bits at different signal level up to layer n where the highest layer represent the
most significant bit (MSB) and the lowest level as the lowest significant bit (LSB).
The receiver can see the up to n most significant bits of x and rest of the bits are
completely obliterated by noise.
The parameter n which is function of SNR determines the number of layers
which are above the noise floor that can be used for reliable communication. Using
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multilevel lattice code in the AWGN channel [12], a coding scheme can be constructed
where at each layer up to layer n , can be thought of a noiseless binary channel, hence,
the maximum rate at each layer can be achieved is 1 . With coding on n layers, the
capacity of the layered channel is approximately equal to n bits per channel use.
3.2. Incorporating Fading in Layered Erasure Deterministic Model
From the above channel model, if the channel state h is constant, the number of
layers that can be used for reliable communications is equal to n, and maximum rate
of that channel is upper bound by n bits/sec per channel use. However, we consider
a fading Gaussian wire-tap, where the channel state is changing in every symbol
time. Hence, for each time instance, the value of the number of the layers can be
different. Furthermore, we are considering a case where the CSI is not available at the
transmitter; therefore, the transmitter cannot adapt the rate of transmission based
on the instantaneous channel state. Hence, the deterministic model without little
modification cannot be directly used to get the layered model for fading Gaussian
channel.
For our fading channel, we represent the number of layers as the channel state
at a particular time. And the value of n is changing every symbol time. We consider
the channel state as random variable N which takes the different values at different
time based on the instantaneous channel state. Since, transmitter does not know the
instantaneous channel state, the dynamic coding cannot be used. Rather, we shall
consider sufficient long codewords to capture the ergodic realization of the channel to
determine the capacity for such channel on the average.
3.3. Channel Model
We consider a layered erasure wire-tap channel model where Alice sends a q-
bit length binary sequence to Bob, where q ∈ N . Channel fading characteristic is
incorporated in the layered eraser model as the erasure of the least significant bits. For
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example, if the channel is good enough, then the received signal is same q-bit length
binary sequence like the original. On the other hand, if the fading state is the worst
i.e. the channel state is zero, then the bits thought to be erased and consequently
receiver does not receive any single bit.
Figure 7. Layered erasure wire-tap channel.
A q-bit layered erasure wire-tap channel, the channel states of the legitimate and
eavesdropper are denoted by N1(t) and N2(t) random sequences respectively, where
t = 1, 2, 3..... is the time index and Ni(t) ∈ {1, 2, 3....q} for i ∈ {1, 2}. We assume
instantaneous realization of the channel state is known to the respective receiver
i.e. N1(t) is known to Bob and N2(t) to Eve at time t , whereas the transmitter
i.e. Alice knows only the statistical properties of N1(t) and N2(t). We assume that
the channels are memoryless and channels states are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). Hence, without loss of generality, we can ignore the time index
for notational convenience.
Before having the formal definition of q-bit layered erasure wire-tap channel,
we need few more explanations. The PMF of a random variable N is expressed as
PN(n) := P [N = n].
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We define the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of
random variable N as
F¯N(n) := P [N ≥ n]. (3.10)
Definition 8. A q-bit layered erasure wire-tap channel has one input X = Xq ∈ Fq2,
and two outputs, one at legitimate receiver Y = XN1 and the other at eavesdropper
Z = XN2 where Ni ∈ {1, 2, 3....q} are the channel states and independent of Xq
satisfying F¯N1(0) = 1, F¯N2(0) = 1 and F¯N1(q + 1) = 0, F¯N2(q + 1) = 0.
For our channel model, the transmitted signal by Alice is
X = Xq = [X1, . . . , Xq], (3.11)
Bob receives
Y = XN1 = [X1, . . . , XN1 ], (3.12)
and Eve receives
Z = XN2 = [X1, . . . , XN2 ]. (3.13)
Now we shall state the main results of analysis to find out the secrecy capacity
for the layered erasure wire-tap channel as explained above.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity of q-bit layered erasure wire-tap channel (N1, N2)
is given by,
Cs =
∑
n:αn>0
(
F¯N1(n)− F¯N2(n)
)
, (3.14)
where αn := F¯N1(n)− F¯N2(n) and n ∈ {1, . . . , q}.
The proof, like any other information-theoretic proof, is consisted of two parts.
Firstly, we shall prove the converse, i.e., the upper-bound for the secrecy rate; later,
the achievability which means the secrecy rate upper-bound can be achieved.
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3.4. Layered Erasure Wire-tap Channel: Converse
The secrecy capacity for a degraded wire-tap channel can be derived from [4],
which is
Cs = max
[
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)], (3.15)
the maximization being carried out over all possible input distribution.
Since our wire-tap channel is the general one, we cannot use this results directly.
To make progress, we enhance the legitimate channel to make it a degraded wire-tap
channel. As we are enhancing the legitimate channel, the resultant secrecy capacity
will be always higher than or at least equal to that of the original channel.
We enhance the legitimate channel by enhancing channel state N1 to N˜1 such
that
F¯N˜1(n) = max
[
F¯N1(n), F¯N2(n)
]
. (3.16)
With lthe lemma from [16], the q-bit layered erasure wiretap channel (N˜1, N2)
is a degraded wiretap channel. We are restating the lemma here, the proof of the
lemma can be found in [16].
Lemma 1. The q-bit layered erasure wire-tap channel (N1, N2) satisfying N1 ≥st N2
is a degraded wire-tap channel.
As a result of lemma 1, our fading Gaussian wire-tap channel (N˜1, N2) is a
degraded wire-tap channel. Hence we can apply (3.15) to get an upper-bound on
the secrecy rate of the enhanced channel, which is a better channel than the original
channel. Therefore any upper bound to the enhanced channel also serves as an upper
bound to the original channel as well. However, we shall show that the secrecy-
rate upper-bound for the enhance one is tight which means the upper-bound for the
enhanced channel can be achieved for the original channel. Hence, although we are
deriving the secrecy rate upper-bound for the enhanced degraded layered erasure
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wire-tap channel, such upper-bound equally works as a tight upper-bound for general
layered erasure wire-tap channel.
Rs ≤ max I(X; Y˜ , N˜1)− I(X;Z,N2) (3.17)
= max
[
I(Xq;XN˜1 , N˜1)− I(Xq;XN2 , N2)
]
(3.18)
= max
[
I(Xq; N˜1) + I(X
q;XN˜1 |N˜1)− I(Xq;N2)− I(Xq;XN2|N2)
]
(3.19)
= max
[
I(Xq;XN˜1|N˜1)− I(Xq;XN2|N2)
]
(3.20)
= max
[
H(XN˜1 |N˜1)−H(XN˜1|Xq, N˜1)−H(XN2|N2) +H(XN2|Xq, N2)
]
(3.21)
= max
[
H(XN˜1 |N˜1)−H(XN2|N2)
]
(3.22)
= max
[ q∑
n=1
PN˜1(n)H(X
n|N˜1 = n)−
q∑
n=1
PN2(n)H(X
n|N2 = n)
]
(3.23)
= max
[ q∑
n=1
n∑
j=1
PN˜1(n)H(Xj|Xj−1)−
q∑
n=1
n∑
j=1
PN2(n)H(Xj|Xj−1)
]
(3.24)
= max
[ q∑
j=1
q∑
n=j
PN˜1(n)H(Xj|Xj−1)−
q∑
j=1
q∑
n=j
PN2(n)H(Xj|Xj−1)
]
(3.25)
= max
[ q∑
j=1
F¯N˜1(j)H(Xj|Xj−1)−
q∑
j=1
F¯N2(j)H(Xj|Xj−1)
]
(3.26)
= max
[ q∑
j=1
(
F¯N˜1(j)− F¯N2(j)
)
H(Xj|Xj−1)
]
. (3.27)
(3.19) follows from the chain rule of entropy. Since, channel state is independent
of the input, both the mutual information terms, I(Xq; N˜1) and I(X
q;N2), are zero
resulting (3.20). By expanding mutual information in terms of entropy, we get (3.21).
Given channel state and input, the out put is known. Hence, both the entropy terms,
H(XN˜1|Xq, N˜1) and H(XN2|Xq, N2), in (3.21) are zero resulting (3.22). (3.23) is
because we are calculating the average entropy. In (3.24), inner summations of both
the entropy terms appear due the chain rule of entropy. By changing order of the
summations, we get (3.25). (3.26) follows directly from the definition of the CCDF.
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Let us define
α˜n := F¯N˜1(n)− F¯N2(n). (3.28)
It follows from the our choice of F¯N˜1 , the difference between the two CCDFs
in above is always nonnegative. Hence we can maximize the rate upper bound by
maximizing the entropy term. We get
Rs ≤ max
[ q∑
j=1
α˜jH(Xj|Xj−1)
]
(3.29)
≤
q∑
j=1
α˜j (3.30)
=
q∑
j=1
(
F¯N˜1(j)− F¯N2(j)
)
, (3.31)
where the first step follows from the fact that conditional entropy can not be larger
than unconditional entropy, which in turn is upper bounded by 1, since Xj, ∀j are
binary random variables.
Let us define
αn := F¯N1(n)− F¯N2(n). (3.32)
Note that, by definition α˜n ≥ 0. Comparing equations (3.28) and (3.32) it is evident
that for any given 1 ≤ j ≤ q,
α˜j =
 αj, if αj > 0,0, if αj ≤ 0. (3.33)
Using these facts it is easy to see that
q∑
j=1
α˜j =
∑
j:αj>0
αj. (3.34)
30
Hence, the final upper-bound for layered erasure wire-tap channel in terms of
CCDFs is
Rs ≤
∑
j:αj>0
(
F¯N1(j)− F¯N2(j)
)
. (3.35)
3.5. Layered Erasure Wire-tap Channel: Achievability
To prove the achievability, first we consider a simple scenario using single layer
erasure wire-tap channel i.e. q = 1 to have the insight, and then we shall derive our
achievable rate for general layered erasure wire-tap channel. Finally, we conclude the
proof of theorem 1 by showing that the upper-bound is achievable.
For single layer case, the channel states Ni can take value 0 and 1 where i ∈ 1, 2.
When channel state takes value of 1, it implies the transmitted bit is received by the
receiver correctly. On the other hand, when the channel state takes value of 0, it
implies the bit is completely erased by the channel.
Let us define, the probability of receiving the bit correctly at the legitimate
receiver as
P [N1 = 1] = F¯N1(1) = ¯1, (3.36)
and the probability that the bit is erased at the legitimate receiver as
P [N1 = 0] = 1− P [N1 = 1] = 1− F¯N1(1) = 1. (3.37)
Similar way we define, the probability of receiving the bit correctly at the
eavesdropper as
P [N2 = 1] = F¯N2(1) = ¯2, (3.38)
and the probability that the bit is erased at the eavesdropper as
Pr[N2 = 0] = 1− Pr[N2 = 1] = 1− F¯N2(1) = 2. (3.39)
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Hence, our single layer erasure wire-tap channel can be viewed as the aggregation
of two binary erasure channels: One is the legitimate binary erasure channel with
erasure probability 1 and the other is the eavesdropper binary erasure channel with
erasure probability 2 . We can compute the capacity of the individual binary erasure
channel using the basic information-theoretic identity. And if the legitimate channel
has higher capacity than the eavesdropper one, we can achieve a secrecy rate which is
the difference between the capacities of the two channels. This is due to the fact that
when the legitimate channel has higher capacity than that of the eavesdropper one,
the single layered erasure wire-tap channel becomes a degraded wire-tap channel.
Note that, in our upper bound expression in (3.35) ,only those layers are present
where F¯N1(n) − F¯N2(n) > 0. For single layer case, this condition implies that the
upper-bound is non zero only when F¯N1(1) > F¯N2(1), i.e., ¯1 > ¯2. Otherwise, the
upper-bound is zero.
From our achievability standpoint, let us assume ¯1 > ¯2. Otherwise the proof
is trivial because the upper-bound is zero.
We know from the basic information-theoretic result (1.29) stated in chapter 1
that the capacity of a binary erasure channel with erasure probability 1 is 1− 1 and
that is achieved when the input has i.i.d. Bernoulli (p = 1/2) distribution.
Hence the maximum achievable rate of the legitimate binary erasure channel is
r1 = 1− 1 = ¯1 = F¯N1(1). (3.40)
Similarly, the maximum achievable rate of eavesdropper binary erasure channel
is
r2 = 1− 2 = ¯2 = F¯N2(1). (3.41)
Since, from our assumption, F¯N1(1) ≥ F¯N2(1), using Wyner’s results [3] for
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degraded wire-tap channel, we can say the achievable secrecy rate for single layer
erasure wire-tap channel is
rs = r1 − r2 (3.42)
= (1− 1)− (1− 2) (3.43)
= ¯1 − ¯2 (3.44)
= F¯N1(1)− F¯N2(1). (3.45)
This concludes the proof of theorem 1 for single layer case.
Now, our achievability for the general layer erasure wire-tap channel follows
exactly same line of argument as presented in the single layer case. First, we partition
the bit levels based on the distribution of the channel states of the receivers. We
use only those layers for which we have αn > 0 is satisfied. Furthermore we use
independent signaling on each layers i.e. X1, ........, Xq are i.i.d. Bernoulli (p = 1/2)
random variables.
Suppose layer n is used for secret communication. We can consider the layer n
channel as two independent binary erasure channels. The erasure probability of the
legitimate channel on layer n is 1− F¯N1(n), and that of the eavesdropper channel at
layer n is 1 − F¯N2(n). We Apply the channel capacity of binary erasure channel to
get the following results.
Hence, the legitimate channel can have a rate of communication at layer n
r1(n) = F¯N1(n), (3.46)
and the eavesdropper can have rate of communication at layer n
r2(n) = F¯N2(n). (3.47)
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Therefore,the achievable secret communication rate at layer n is
rs(n) = r1(n)− r2(n) (3.48)
= F¯N1(n)− F¯N2(n). (3.49)
Using independent signaling on each layer n : αn > 0, the achievable secrecy
rate for general layered erasure wire-tap channel is
R∗s =
∑
n:αn>0
r1(n)− r2(n) (3.50)
=
∑
n:αn>0
(
F¯N1(n)− F¯N2(n)
)
. (3.51)
It is clear that this rate coincide with the upper-bound (3.35). This concludes the
proof the theorem 1.
Next, we provide an example to illustrate further.
Example 1. Consider the following layered erasure wire-tap channel with PMFs of
the channel states N1, N2 are defined by
PN1(n) =

1
3
, n = 0
0, n = 1
1
3
, n = 2
1
3
, n = 3
(3.52)
PN2(n) =

1
4
, n = 0
1
4
, n = 1
1
4
, n = 2
1
4
, n = 3
(3.53)
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in which the legitimate channel seems stronger at bit level 2 and 3 whereas the
eavesdropper channel looks stronger at bit level 1. Hence the resulting layered erasure
wire-tap channel is neither degraded nor more capable. The corresponding CCDFs
are given by
F¯N1(n) =

1, n = 0
2
3
, n = 1
2
3
, n = 2
1
3
, n = 3
(3.54)
F¯N2(n) =

1, n = 0
3
4
, n = 1
1
2
, n = 2
1
4
, n = 3
(3.55)
Hence, the usable layers for secret communication are bit levels 2 3. The
resulting secrecy capacity is
Cs =
∑
n∈{2,3}
(
F¯N1(n)− F¯N2(n)
)
(3.56)
=
(
F¯N1(2)− F¯N2(2)
)
+
(
F¯N1(3)− F¯N2(3)
)
(3.57)
= 0.25 bit per channel use. (3.58)
In next chapter, we shall consider the fading Gaussian wire-tap channel.
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CHAPTER 4. FADING GAUSSIAN WIRE-TAP
CHANNEL
With the insights from the layered erasure wire-tap channel, we shall derive
an upper bound for Gaussian fading wire-tap channel. In this scenario, the channel
states can take any value, and the CSI is not known at the transmitter. We use
the similar technique of channel enhancement to create a degraded fading Gaussian
wire-tap channel and then applying (2.5) we l get an upper-bound. Although we do
not have a general achievable scheme to attain that upper-bound, we show that for
some distributions, the upper-bound can be achieved.
4.1. Channel Model
Let X(t), Y (t), Z(t) the transmitted signal by Alice, received signal at Bob, and
received signal at Eve respectively at time t.
The channel model is
Y (t) =
√
S1(t)e
jθ1(t)X(t) + U1(t) (4.1)
Z(t) =
√
S2(t)e
jθ2(t)X(t) + U2(t), (4.2)
where
(
S1(t), θ1(t)
)
and
(
S2(t), θ2(t)
)
denotes the channel gains and phases of the
legitimate and eavesdropper channel respectively, and U1(t), U2(t) are independent
circular symmetric complex Gaussian(CSCG) random variable with unit variance at
time t. Since, our wire-tap channel is memoryless and changing independently at
each symbol time, we can omit the time index for simpler notation.
Hence our channel model becomes
Y =
√
S1e
jθ1X + U1 (4.3)
Z =
√
S2e
jθ2X + U2. (4.4)
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Figure 8. Gaussian fading wire-tap channel.
We consider a complex Gaussian wire-tap channel i.e. Alice transmits a complex
baseband signal X = (XI + jXQ)/
√
2 with unit power constraint. The phases θi is
known to the respective receiver, both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper can
post rotate the signal phases by −θi to get rid of the phase component.
Hence, the received signal at Bob can be represented in terms of real and
quadrature components YI and YQ
YI + jY Q =
√
2e−jθY (4.5)
=
√
2e−jθ
√
S1e
jθ1(XI + jXQ)/
√
2 +
√
2U1e
−jθ (4.6)
=
√
S1(XI + jXQ) + U1,I + jU1,Q (4.7)
= (
√
S1XI + U1,I) + j(
√
S1XQ + U1,Q). (4.8)
Simillar way, the received signal by Eve can be represented as in-phase and
quadrature components
ZI + jZQ = (
√
S2XI + U2,I) + j(
√
S2XQ + U2,Q). (4.9)
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Thus, the complex channel can be treated as a pair of identical real channels
independent of each other. If we compute the achievable rate for one channel, same
can be achieved for the other channel.
Now onward we shall consider only the real-valued Gaussian wiretap channel.
The capacity of the original complex Gaussian wire-tap channel is just double of the
capacity we get for the real-valued channel.
Hence our final channel model becomes,
Y =
√
S1X + U1, Z =
√
S2X + U2, (4.10)
where X is the transmitted signal by Alice with unit power constraint, Y and Z
are the received signal by Bob and Eve respectively, U1 and U2 are additive noise at
respective receiver and normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. We
call the (4.10) as the fading Gaussian wire-tap channel (S1, S2).
When either of the legitimate or eavesdropper channel is in state s, the receiver
observes a output identically distributed as
Y (s) :=
√
sX + U, (4.11)
where the U ∼ N (0, 1) is identically distributed as each Ui . For a fading channel
where the fading state is a random process S, the ergodic capacity of the point-to-
point fading channel (4.11) with unit transmit power is
Ce(S) :=
1
2
ES
[
log(1 + s)
]
=
1
2
∫ ∞
0
fS(s) log(1 + s)ds, (4.12)
and the capacity is achieved with Gaussian input [14][15]. (4.12) represent the ergodic
capacity of a point-to-point real fading channel.
38
Now, we state the main results of the secrecy rate of the fading Gaussian wire-
tap channel defined by (4.3) and (4.4). We define the complementary CDF of a
random variable S as F¯S(s) := P [S ≥ s].
Theorem 2. Any achievable secrecy rate, Rs, on an fast fading Gaussian wire-tap
channel defined by ( 4.3) and ( 4.4) with arbitrary fading statistics and instantaneous
channel realizations known only at the corresponding receivers, is upper bounded as
Rs ≤ log e
∫
I1
(
F¯S1(s)− F¯S2(s)
) 1
1 + s
ds, (4.13)
where I1 :=
{
s ≥ 0|F¯S1(s) > F¯S2(s)
}
.
On a typical communication channel, finding good upper-bounds turns out to be
more challenging than finding good achievable coding schemes. However, on a wire-
tap channel, since any achievable scheme need to make sure that the eavesdropper can
not extract any information, finding effective achievable schemes are as challenging
as the converse. In contrast to the layered case, it seems unlikely that one achievable
scheme will be capacity achieving for all channel statistics. Therefore, while we do
not have an achievable scheme which meets the upper bound of the above Theorem
for general channel statistics, for two very important class of practical wireless
channels,namely fading wire-tap channels in urban and rural wireless environments,
we prescribe achievable schemes which can. As a result for these class of channels we
have exact secrecy capacity characterization. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first capacity result on ergodic fading wiretap channel.
In the sequel, we shall show that these aforementioned practical channels belong
to a rather interesting class of channels which we hereafter refer to as the class of
Stochastically degraded channels. Next we define the stochastically degraded wire-tap
channel for which our theorem can be used to compute the exact secrecy capacity.
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Definition 9 (Stochastically degraded channel). We call a fast fading wire-tap
channel described by equations ( 4.3) and ( 4.4) a stochastically degraded channel if
F¯S1(s) ≥ F¯S2(s), ∀s ≥ 0. In what follows, we shall use the notation S1 ≥st S2 to
denote a stochastically degraded wiretap channel.
Theorem 3 below is a special case of the general upper-bound described in
Theorem 2 and will later be useful to characterize the capacity of stochastically
degraded class of wire-tap channels.
Theorem 3. The secrecy capacity of a stochastically degraded fading Gaussian wire-
tap channel described by ( 4.3) and ( 4.4), is given by
Cs = log e
∫ ∞
0
(
F¯S1(s)− F¯S2(s)
) 1
1 + s
ds. (4.14)
Next, we prove theorem 2 and 3. First, we derive the upper-bound.
4.2. Fading Gaussian Wire-tap Channel: Upper-Bound
We follow the similar approach as in the layered case to enhance the legitimate
channel to make it a degraded wiretap channel. The secrecy rate upper-bound for the
enhanced channel is naturally an upper-bound for the original (S1, S2) , The secrecy
capacity of original channel cannot be larger than that of the enhanced one.
We define,
F¯S˜1(s) = max
[
F¯S1(s), F¯S2(s)
]
. (4.15)
We need following lemma taken from [16] to prove that resulting fading Gaussian
wire-tap channel (S˜1, S2) is a degraded wire-tap channel.
Lemma 2. The fading Gaussian wiretap channel (S1, S2) satisfying S1 ≥st S2 is a
degraded wiretap channel.
40
As a result of lemma, now we can apply (2.5) to get the upper bound
Rs ≤ max
[
I(X; Y˜ , S˜1)− I(X;Z, S2)
]
(4.16)
= max
[
I(X; S˜1) + I(X; Y˜ |S˜1)− I(X;S2)− I(X;Z|S2)
]
(4.17)
= max
[
I(X; Y˜ |S˜1)− I(X;Z|S2)
]
(4.18)
= max
[
h(Y˜ |S˜1)− h(Y˜ |X, S˜1)− h(Z|S2) + h(Z|X,S2)
]
(4.19)
= max
[
h(Y˜ |S˜1)− h(U1)− h(Z|S2) + h(U2)
]
(4.20)
= max
[
h(Y˜ |S˜1)− h(Z|S1)
]
(4.21)
= max
[ ∫ ∞
0
fS˜1(s)h(
√
sX + U |S˜1 = s)ds−
∫ ∞
0
fS2(s)h(
√
sX + U |S2 = s)ds
]
(4.22)
= max
[ ∫ ∞
0
fS˜1(s)h(
√
sX + U)ds−
∫ ∞
0
fS2(s)h(
√
sX + U)ds
]
(4.23)
= max
[ ∫ ∞
0
(
fS˜1(s)− fS2(s)
)
h(Y (s))ds
]
. (4.24)
(4.17) follows from the chain rule of mutual information. Since, we assume no
CSI at transmitter, hence the input and channel states are independent to each other.
Therefore, the mutual information between input and channel state is zero and we
have (4.18). We express the mutual information in terms of entropy in (4.19). Since,
U1, U2 ∼ N (0, 1) , the differential entropies of them are same and cancel each other
resulting (4.21). Using (4.11), we derive the average differential entropy in (4.22).
Note that in (4.24),finally we get the difference of the two PDFs which is always
non-negative.
Let us define
F¯d(s) := F¯S˜1(s)− F¯S2(s). (4.25)
Note that F¯d(s) is defined as the difference of two CCDFs. However, F¯d(s) itself
is not a CCDF.
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Differentiating (4.25), we get
d
ds
Fd(s) =
d
ds
(
F¯S˜1(s)− F¯S2(s)
)
(4.26)
= −fS˜1(s) + fS2(s). (4.27)
By denoting, fd(s) := − ddsFd(s), we can write (4.27) as
fd(s) = fS˜1(s)− fS2(s). (4.28)
Substituting (4.28) in (4.24) , we get
Rs ≤ max
[ ∫ ∞
0
fd(s)h(Y
(s))ds
]
. (4.29)
Using integration by parts, we get
∫ ∞
0
fd(s)h(Y
(s))ds =
[
h(Y (s))
∫
fd(s)ds
]∞
0
−
∫ ∞
0
[ d
ds
h(Y (s))
∫
fd(s)ds
]
ds (4.30)
= F¯d(0)h(U)− F¯d(∞)h(∞X + U) +
∫ ∞
0
F¯d(s)
d
ds
h(Y (s))ds
(4.31)
=
∫ ∞
0
F¯d(s)
d
ds
h(Y (s))ds. (4.32)
From the defintion of F¯d(s) in (4.25), we have F¯d(0) = F¯S˜1(0)−F¯S2(0) = 1−1 = 0
and F¯d(∞) = F¯S˜1(∞)− F¯S2(∞) = 0− 0 = 0 which results (4.32). Consider the term
F¯d(∞)h(∞X+U) in (4.32), where the CCDF is a decreasing function of its argument
and the differential entropy increases logarithmically with variance of the RV. The
rate of decrease of the CCDF is faster than the rate of increase of the differential
entropy. Hence the combined term results zero.
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Substituting (4.32) in (4.29) , we get
Rs ≤ max
[ ∫ ∞
0
F¯d(s)
d
ds
h(Y (s))ds
]
. (4.33)
Since I(X;Y (s)) = h(Y (s)) − h(U), we have d
ds
I(X;Y (s)) = d
ds
h(Y (s)). Substituting
this in (4.33) we get
Rs ≤ max
[ ∫ ∞
0
F¯d(s)
d
ds
I(X;Y (s))ds
]
. (4.34)
It was shown in [17] that
d
ds
I(X;Y (s)) =
log e
2
mmse(s), (4.35)
where minimum mean square error (mmse) is given by
mmse(s) := E
[(
X − E[X|Y (s)])2]. (4.36)
Furthermore, we have an upper bound for mmse [16], which is given by
mmse(s) ≤ 1
1 + s
. (4.37)
This upper-bound of mmse can be achieved with Gaussian input.
We define
I˜1 :=
{
s ≥ 0|F¯d(s) > 0
}
. (4.38)
Hence, our upper bound becomes
Rs ≤ log e
2
∫
I˜1
F¯d(s)
1
1 + s
ds. (4.39)
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Since s ∈ I1 implies F¯S˜1(s) = F¯S1(s), we can set the partition of the SNR I˜1 = I1
where I1 :=
{
s ≥ 0|F¯S1(s) > F¯S2(s)
}
.
Hence, the upper-bound can be written as
Rs ≤ log e
2
∫
I1
(
F¯S1(s)− F¯S2(s)
) 1
1 + s
ds. (4.40)
If we consider signaling for both in-phase and quadrature component channels,
the final upper-bound can be written as
Rs ≤ log e
∫
I1
(
F¯S1(s)− F¯S2(s)
) 1
1 + s
ds. (4.41)
4.2.1. Special Case: Upper-bound for a Degraded Channel
Clearly, for a stochastically degraded wire-tap channel, the partition of channel
states would not be required. We have proved that in Lemma 2 that for a stochasti-
cally degraded wire-tap channel, F¯S1(s) ≥ F¯S2(s),∀s. Hence the partition of SNR is
valid for all values of channel state, i.e., I1 = {s ≥ 0}
Hence for a for a stochastically degraded fading Gaussian wire-tap channel, the
secrecy rate upper-bound is given by
Rsd ≤ log e
∫ ∞
0
(
F¯S1(s)− F¯S2(s)
) 1
1 + s
ds. (4.42)
4.3. Fading Gaussian Wire-tap Channel: Achievability
Our achievability scheme for fading Gaussian wire-tap channel follows a different
approach than that of the layered case. We cannot use the layered decoding
argument for Gaussian case, because we cannot just dictate the eavesdropper to
obey the decoding rule as we instruct. The eavesdropper can have arbitrary decoding
technique, hence the layered achievability argument for Gaussian case fails.
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Instead, we shall derive the achievable scheme directly from the capacity
expression for some familiar input distributions which have the potential to be the
optimal. Then, we compare those achievable rates to the upper-bound (4.41) to see
how close they are.
We have capacity expression for a discrete memoryless channel wire-tap channel
which is given by (2.4). We are restating the expression here.
Cs =
max
V→X→Y,Z
[
I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)] (4.43)
Cs is maximum secrecy rate where the maximization is taken over all possible joint
distributions of PV,X(v, x) . Instead of looking for the optimal V,X that gives the
maximum secrecy rate ( in fact, nobody has found the optimal V,X. That is why the
secrecy capacity of Gaussian channel is open for so many years) , rather we would
avoid the complicated maximization problem by choosing some specific distributions
of V,X . The rate we get for a specific distribution is an achievable rate and (4.43)
serves as an upper-bound for all achievable rates. We carefully choose V,X that have
potential to be optimal. Since for most of the channel, Gaussian input is optimal, we
shall choose V,X both to be Gaussian in our achievable scheme.
4.3.1. Achievable Rate with V = X ∼ N (0, 1)
We shall evaluate the achievable rate for input with Gaussian distribution and
set the auxiliary random variable V equal to the input. In this setting, we have
V = X = XG where XG ∼ N (0, 1). We denote this achievable secrecy rate as RGs .
From (4.43), we have
RGs = I(X
G;Y |S1)− I(XG;Z|S2) (4.44)
= ES1
[
log(1 + s1)
]− ES2[ log(1 + s2)]. (4.45)
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In (4.45), we have used the ergodic rate of point-to-point fading channel with
Gaussian input as given by (4.12) for a complex channel. We can simplify
ES1
[
log(1 + s1)
]
=
∫ ∞
0
fS1(s) log(1 + s)ds (4.46)
=
[
log(1 + s)
∫
fS1(s)ds
]∞
0
−
∫ ∞
0
[ d
ds
log(1 + s)
∫
fS1(s)ds
]
ds
(4.47)
= − log(1)F¯S1(0) + log(∞)F¯S1(∞)− log e
∫ ∞
0
[− 1
1 + s
F¯S1(s)
]
ds
(4.48)
= log e
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + s
F¯S(s)ds. (4.49)
Similar way we have
ES2 [log(1 + s2)] = log e
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + s
F¯S2(s)ds. (4.50)
Substituting the results of (4.49) and (4.50) in (4.45), we get
RGs = log e
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + s
F¯S1(s)ds− log e
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + s
F¯S2(s)ds (4.51)
= log e
∫ ∞
0
(
F¯S1(s)− F¯S2(s)
) 1
1 + s
ds. (4.52)
For a general wire-tap channel, the difference between the CCDF is not
necessarily non-negative for ∀s ≥ 0. Hence, the achievable secrecy rate for Gaussian
input cannot achieve the upper-bound. But if the wire-tap channel is a stochastically
degraded wire-tap channel, we can say that Gaussian input without prefixing is
optimal, i.e., the secrecy rate RGs for Gaussian input matches the upper bound (4.42).
In the next chapter, we apply secrecy capacity result to derive the secrecy
capacity of two popular class of wireless channels.
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CHAPTER 5. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF OUR
RESULTS
In this research work, we found that Gaussian input is secrecy capacity achieving
for stochastically degraded wire-tap channels.There are many practical wireless
communication systems where, the channels are either stochastically degraded or
reversely degraded. In those cases, the general converse (4.41) naturally yields the
converse for the special case (4.42). For those class of wire-tap channels, our theorem
3 in chapter 4 can be readily used to compute the secrecy capacities. We shall consider
two of such class of channels: channels with Rayleigh fading distribution and Richian
fading distribution.
5.1. Secrecy Capacity of Fading Wire-tap Channel in Urban Area
To model the wireless environment in an urban area, cellular wireless networks
generally use the Rayleigh fading model to represent the random channel coeffi-
cients [18]. This is because Rayleigh fading model works better for the heavily built-up
urban area where there is no dominant line of sight propagation and the obstacles to
wireless signals are more or less uniformly distributed between the transmitters and
the receivers.
For Rayleigh fading, the channel gain
√
s is Rayleigh distributed and the s has
an exponential distribution which has a PDF fS(s) = λe
−sλ, and corresponding CDF
is FS(s) = e
−sλ where the SNR of the channel is given by E[s] = 1
λ
.
Hence the CCDF of the channel is
F¯S(s) = e
−sλ. (5.1)
We plot the CCDF against channel strength for different values of λ. Note that
in the figure 9, the graph the CCDF with high variance is always remains high for
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Figure 9. CCDFs vs channel state for different values of λ for Rayleigh fading.
all value of channel strength. Since, the Rayleigh fading model is the most accurate
model for urban setting, therefore the wire-tap channel in a cellular wireless network
environment is either stochastically degraded or reversely degraded.Therefore, the
general converse and the degraded case converse have the same expression because
of the fact that there is no partition of SNR. For those class of channels, our general
converse is tight and achievable. Hence, we can apply theorem 2 to compute the
secrecy capacity.
Consider a Rayleigh fading Gaussian wire-tap channel. The CCDF of the
legitimate channel is
F¯S1(s) = e
−sλ1 , (5.2)
and the CCDF of the evaesdropper is
F¯S1(s) = e
−sλ2 . (5.3)
We assume λ1 ≤ λ2. Otherwise, computing secrecy capacity is trivial because,
in that case, the capacity is zero.
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The secrecy capacity is given by Theorem 2
Curbans = log e
∫ ∞
0
(
e−sλ1 − e−sλ2) 1
1 + s
ds. (5.4)
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Figure 10. Secrecy Capacity vs λ2/λ1 for different values of 1/λ2 for fading Gaussian
wire-tap channel with Rayleigh fading.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 900
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
1/λ2
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
, C
sU
rb
an
 
 
λ2/λ1 =5
λ2/λ1 =10
λ2/λ1 =15
λ2/λ1 =20
Figure 11. Secrecy Capacity vs 1/λ2 for different value of λ2/λ1 for fading Gaussian
wire-tap channel with Rayleigh fading.
Figure 10 and figure 11 show the relationship between secrecy capacity Curbans
and different values of λ1, λ2.
5.2. Secrecy Capacity of Fading Wire-tap Channel in Rural Area
Unlike Rayleigh model, Rician model is used for wireless environment where
there is dominant path of propagation along with other multipath propagation for
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signal. Usually, cellular network in the countryside or along the highway exhibits
Rician model like behavior.
Let us assume the channel state s has Rician distribution. Hence the PDF is
fS(s) =
x
σ2
e
(
−(x2+v2)
2σ2
)
I0(
sv
σ2
), where I0(.) is the modified Bessel function of the first
kind with zero order. The corresponding CDF is FS(s) = 1−−Q1( vσ , sσ ), where Q1 is
the Marcum Q-function. Variance is a increasing function of v for a particular value
of σ.
Hence the CCDF of the channel is
F¯S(s) = Q1(
v
σ
,
s
σ
). (5.5)
We plot the CCDF against channel state for different values of v with σ = 1.
Note that, in the figure 12, we can have either stochastically degraded or reversely
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 90
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
s 
Co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 C
D
F,
  1
− 
F S
(s)
 
 
 
v=0.5
v =1
v =2
v =4
Figure 12. CCDFs vs channel state for different values of v for Rician fading.
degraded wire-tap channel for Rician distribution as well. Consider the CCDF of the
legitimate channel is
F¯S1(s) = Q1(
v1
σ
,
s
σ
), (5.6)
and the CCDF of the eavesdropper is
F¯S1(s) = Q1(
v2
σ
,
s
σ
). (5.7)
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Again,we assume v1 > v2. Otherwise, computing secrecy capacity is trivial
because in that case, the capacity is zero.
The secrecy capacity is given by Theorem 2
Crurals = log e
∫ ∞
0
(
Q1(
v1
σ
,
s
σ
)−Q1(v2
σ
,
s
σ
)
) 1
1 + s
ds. (5.8)
Figure 13 and figure 14 show the relationship between secrecy capacity Curbans
and different value of v1, v2.
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Figure 13. Secrecy Capacity vs v1/v2 for different values of v2 for fading Gaussian
wire-tap channel with Rician fading.
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Figure 14. Secrecy Capacity vs v2 for different value of v1/v2 for fading Gaussian
wire-tap channel with Rician fading.
Remark 1. Note that for two of the most predominant wireless environments, namely
the urban setting and the rural setting, the capacity characterization of this thesis
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provides complete answer to the secrecy capacity question. For more general fading
environments, Theorem 2 provides an upper-bound to the secrecy capacity and finding
achievable schemes which can achieve this upper-bound constitutes a very interesting
topic for future research.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
We have considered the problem of communicating secret information to a
desired receiver through a wireless medium in the presence of a eavesdropping receiver.
Time varying channel strength is a very critical issue in wireless channels. Earlier
research towards characterization of the secrecy capacity assume the knowledge of this
time varying channel strength at the transmitter. For any communication link, the
corresponding channel strength is generally measured at the receivers and feed back
to the transmitters. Thus for the wireless wiretap channel the availability of channel
state information (CSI) at transmitters is not a reasonable assumption, because that
would mean the eavesdropper informs the transmitter about its channel strength
continuously.
In this work, we assume that the channel states are not available at the
transmitter and are known only at the corresponding receivers. To gain insight we first
consider a layered abstraction of channels with real channel coefficients and exactly
characterize the secrecy capacity of this layered model. The insight revealed from this
layered model enable us to derive an outer bound to the capacity of the real channel
where the time varying channel coefficients of both the main and eavesdropper channel
can assume arbitrary statistics. We then identify a rather broad class of channels -
called stochastically degraded channels here - for which we characterize the secrecy
capacity of the channel. To establish this later result, in addition to the previously
mentioned upper bound, we also needed an achievable scheme which can attain a rate
same as the upper bound. We show that a Gaussian distributed input can achieve a
rate same as the upper bound. This rate thus also represents the secrecy capacity of
the channel. Moreover, to illustrate the application of the result of this thesis work in
practical scenarios in chapter 5 we have shown that it can be used to characterize the
secrecy capacity of two very important and often encountered wireless environments,
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namely the urban and the rural environments. In other wireless settings, the general
upper bound to capacity provides the first step and paves the way to future research
towards exact secrecy capacity characterization.
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